Activist Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Overshooting: The Deutsche Mark/Dollar Rate by David H. Papell
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
ACTIVIST MONETARY POLICYAND EXCHANGE RATE
OVERSHOOTING:THE DEUTSCHEMARK/DOLLAR RATE
DavidH. Papell





I am gratefti to Eleanor Brown, Howard Kaufold, and participants at
seminars at Columbia University, New York University-, and the
National Bureau of Economic Research 1982 Summer Institute, for
their comments. The research reported here is part of the NBER's
research program in International Studies. Any- opinions expressed are
those of the author and not those of the National Bureau of Economic
Research.NBER Working Paper 111195
August 1983
Activist Nonetary Policy and Exchange Rate Overshooting:
The Deutsche Nark/Dollar Rate
ABSTRACT
After a decade of generalized floating, it is clear that bilateral
exchange rates exhibit more variability than the economic aggregates;
relative prices, incomes, and money supplies, that generally comprise the
fundamentals of theories of exchange rate determination. Dornbush's over-
shooting hypothesis is the best known explanation of this phenomenon. This
paper shows that accommodative monetary policy (with respect to prices)has
the potential to cause the economy to switch from exchange rate overshooting
to undershooting. Using constrained maximum likelihood methods, the model is
estimated for Germany and the United States. The results provide strong







It is by now well established that bilateral exchange rates exhibit more
variability than the economic aggregates—relative prices, incomes, and money
supplies——that generally form the fundamentals of theories of exchange rate
determination.1 In particular, it is clear that real exchange rate
variability, or deviations from purchasing power parity, characterized the
1970's. Real exchange rate variability provides an important channel through
which one country's economic policies affect other countries. Flexible
exchange rates no longer seem to offer the promise of macroeconomic
independence that they once did.
The overshooting hypothesis, as exemplified by Dornbusch (1976), was an
attempt to explain this pattern of variability. Using a model with perfect
capital mobility, fixed output, and slow price adjustment, he showed how an
increase in the (exogenous) money supply would cause the exchange rate first
to depreciate beyond its long run equilibrium value, and then to appreciate
back to the steady state.2 Frankel (1979) estimated a two—country model with
many similarities to that of Dornbusch, and found evidence supporting
overshooting for the Deutsche mark/dollar rate. Subsequently, Frenkel and
Rodriguez (1982) have argued that overshooting is not an intrinsic
characteristic of the foreign exchange market. Allowing for imperfect capital
mobility in the Dornbusch model, they raise the possibility of undershooting,
where the initial depreciation, below its long run equilibrium value, is
followed by further depreciation until the steady state is attained.3
The overshootIng results described above are derived under the assumption
that the money supply is exogenous, an assumption that is at odds with the
available empirical evidence. For example, Mussa (1981b) argues that the
behavior of exchange rates has influenced the conduct of monetary policy in
1the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany. Taylor (1982) provides
econometric evidence that the money supply accommodates price movements in a
number of countries.
This paper considers the effect of activist monetary policy on exchange
rate overshooting.4 The model is a two—country, variable output version of
Dornbusch's model with the money supply responsive to price and/or exchange
rate movements. The main theoretical result is that accommodative monetary
policy (with respect to prices) can cause the economy to switch from exchange
rate overshooting to undershooting. This can occur even with fixed output,
slow price adjustment, and perfect capital mobility.
Using quarterly data beginning in 1973, the model is estimated for
Germany and the United States. The policy and structural parameters are
jointly estimated in accordance with Lucas? (1976) critique of econometric
policy evaluation. Constrained maximum likelihood techniques, which impose
the cross equation restrictions derived from the structural equations and
assumption of rational expectations, are used for the estimation. Two
measures of the price index are used, the Wholesale Price Index (WPI) and the
Gross National Product Deflator, The results provide strong evidence in
support of the overshooting hypothesis for the Deutsche Nark/Dollar exchange
rate. For the WPI, the exchange rate overshoots because neither German nor
American monetary policy is particularly responsive to prices. For the GNP
deflator, the exchange rate overshoots because accommodative American monetary
policy is counteracted by offsetting German monetary policy. While the
combination of policies is accommodative, it is not sufficiently accommodative
to produce undershooting. Variable output is unimportant.
The results of this paper are relevant to an analysis of recent develop—
ments in American monetary policy. They predict that a less accommodative
2American monetary policy will increase the amount of overshooting of the
Deutsche mark/dollar Rate. While the sample period is too short to formally
test for a change in the money supply rule with the advent of the Reagan
administration, it is possible to conjecture that one of the reasons for the
high volatility of the Deutsche mark/dollar rate beginning in 1981 maybea
less accommodative monetary policy on the part of the United States.5
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section
II. The theoretical results concerning overshooting and undershootirig are
derived in Section III and the model is estimated in Section IV. Conclusions
and extensions are presented in Section V.
II. The Model
The model is a two—country, variable output version of Dornbusch (1976),
which differs from the work of Dornbusch and Frankel in the specification of
the price adjustment equation and in that the domestic and foreign money
supplies are determined endogenously. In order to focus attention on the
relationship between monetary activism and exchange rate overshooting, to
provide comparability between this and previous work, and to remain tractable,
the model contains a number of simplifying assumptions.6 It consists of the
following equations.7
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wherem is the logarithm of
p is the logarithm of
y is the logarithm of
e is the logarithm of
foreign exchange),
i is the domestic nominal interest rate,
*associatedwith a variable indicates that itrefers to the foreign
country,
over a variable indicates deviation from the steady state level,
is the steady state level of output,
is the exogenous component of the money supply,
is the expectation of the exchange rate for period t+i, conditional
information available in period t.
are random disturbances, which may be serially correlated.
market equilibrium is described in Equation (1). Supply of and
real balances in each country are equated in equilibrium, and the

















Setting the income elasticity of the demand for money equal to unity does not
affect the theoretical results. Equating the interest rate semi—elasticities
4
it =it+ (e+i— et)
the domestic money supply,
the domestic price level,
domestic real income,
the exchange rate (domestic currency price ofof the two countries is done for tractability.8 Equation (1) is obtained by
subtracting (ib) from (Ia) andsettingEi =it
—
C12t
The deviation of output from its long run equilibrium (natural rate)
level in each country depends on the relative price of domestic and foreign
goods in equations (2) and (3). If the relative price of foreign goodsis
high (e +p
> domestic output is above and foreign output is below
their respective long run values.'0'1' It is assumed that long run purchasing
power parity holds + =
Thebehavior of prices described by equation (4) encompasses two
influential formulations. In Dornbusch (1976), the rate of inflation depends
on relative prices, which in turn represents excessdemand in the goods





which,by subtraction and setting a5b1 +b2
and = — C42t1becomes
equation (4) with a4 =0.Mussa (1981a, 1982) argues that a superior
formulation is to specify the rate of inflation as equal to the expectedrate
of change of the equilibrium price level, plus some proportion(<1)of the
difference between the equilibrium and actual pricelevels.'2 With long run
purchasing power parity and, as in Dornbusch (1976),pre—determined prices,
Mussa's specification is,'3






whichcan be manipulated to become equation (4) with at
=1.Dornbusch's and
Mussa's equations produce quite similar theoretical resultswith regard to
5over and undershootirig. Equation (4) spans the two formulations, and allows
us to distinguish between them empirically.
The money supply for each country depends on both the exchange rate and
on the difference between domestic and foreign prices.14 The monetary
authorities are assumed to use the information conveyed by the contemporaneous
exchange rate and (pre—determined) prices.'5 From the perspective of the
domestic country, if the exchange rate depreciates (increases), the money
supply is accommodative if a, > 0, offsetting if < 0. For example, an
offsetting rule would decrease the money supply in response to a depreciation
in order to cause the exchange rate to appreciate. From the foreign country's
perspective, since a depreciation is a decrease in e, an accommodative rule
consists of a8 > 0, an offsetting rule of a8 < 0.
The terminology with respect to price movements is similar. If the ratio
of domestic to foreign prices increases, policy is accommodative ifa7 and/or
a9 > 0, offsetting if a7 and/or a9 < 0. The money supply is constrained to
respond to the price ratio, rather than to the levels separately, because, in
the reduced form of the model, prices appear only in ratio form. This can
cause some semantic difficulties in considering foreign price movements. In
some of the discussions of supply shocks, an increase in the foreign price
level (or price of the impOrted good) would cause the domestic price index to
increase. In that context, accommodative monetary policy implies that the
domestic money supply increases when the foreign price level increases. In
this paper, accommodative monetary policy implies that the domestic money
supply decreases when the foreign price level increases. While allowing the
money supplies to respond separately to domestic and foreign price levels
would be preferable to the scheme adopted in this paper, it would make the
model analytically intractable.'6 The money supply could have been postulated
6to respond directly to output movements without affecting the theoretical
results. This would constrain a =—a'.In this sense, monetary policy that
offsets exchange rate movements and accommodates price movements can be
interpreted as attempting to stabilize output. In addition, the money supply
rule for each country includes an exogenous term and a stochastic disturbance
term.
Equation (7) is the representation of uncovered interest rate parity:
the domestic interest rate equals the foreign interest rate plus the expected
rate of depreciation. While the empirical evidence concerning this
proposition has been mixed, it is at worst a fairly good approximation for the
Deutsche mark/dollar rate.17
LII. Overshooting and Undershooting
In this section, it is shown how monetary policy that accommodates price
movements can cause exchange rate undershooting in a situation that would
otherwise be characterised by overshooting. In Dornbusch (1976),
undershooting can only occur if the elasticity of demand for output with
respect to relative prices is greater than one, while in Frenkel and Rodriguez
(1982), imperfect capital mobility is necessary for undershooting. This paper
shows that, even when output is fixed and capital perfectly mobile,
sufficiently accommodative monetary policy can cause the exchange rate to
undershoot.
The clearest way to derive and illustrate these results is through a
deterministic specification with perfect foresight expectations. (The
econometric work below will, of course, be presented in a stochastic, rational
expectation setting.) Assuming that expectations are perfect foresight,
setting the disturbances equal to zero, substituting equations (2), (3), (5),






where Pt —p(the logarithm of the ratio of domestic to foreign prices)








63 =61a4+ a5 64 =62a4
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Several configurations of the modelcanbe produced by considering
different money supply rules. We assume that the money supply18 either
offsets or is not too accommodative of exchange rate movements, so that
> 0. (If < 0, there can be either overshooting or a non—unique
solution, but not undershooting.) If monetary policy acts to stabilize
Output, a6 and < 0, 6i > 0 and the possibility of non-uniqueness does not
arise.'9 The behavior of the model is now determined by the elasticity of
domestic andforeigndemand with respect to relative prices (a2 + a3), and the
degree of accommodation of domestic (a7)andforeign (ag) monetary policy to
price movements. The case where output is not too variable and/or policy is
not too accommodative, so that 62 > 0, is illustrated in Figure 1.20 In order
to facilitate comparison withpreviouswork, we depict Dornbusch's formulation
(a4 =0)where the slope of the Dq =0curve is equal to unity. This is
solely for the purpose of illustration; the results are not affected.
With both and 62 > 0, the slope of the Det =0curve is negative.
Consider an unanticipated, permanent increase in the exogenous component of
the domestic money supply,21 starting from a position of long run equilibrium,
which shifts the Det =0schedule to the right.22 The motion of the variable
8is indicated by the direction of the arrows, which are drawn in reference to
the schedules once the disturbance occurs. The unique perfect foresight
equlibrium path, the saddle path, is downward sloping. The initial
equilibrium is at E. At the time of the disturbance, the price level, being
pre—determined, is fixed. The exchange rate must jump (depreciate) toE1 so
as to be on the new saddle path, and then appreciate along the saddle path
towards the new long run equilibrium E2. This, of course, is the process of
overshooting described by Dornbusch.
Now consider the case where there is either enough monetary accommodation
to price movements and/or the elasticity of demand with respect to relative
prices is high enough so that < 0. As illustrated in Figure 2, 1 > 0 and
< 0 implies that the slope of the Det =0curve is positive.23 Since the
slope of the saddle path is now positive, there is exchange rate
undershooting. Following the increase in ,theexchange rate depreciates to
El. It then continues to depreciate until the long run equilibrium is
attained at E2.
It is illustrative to compare these results with those of Dornbusch.If
both countries' money supplies are exogenous, i.e., if there is no response to
either the exchange rate or the price ratio, the model reduces toDornbusch's
flexible output case. The necessary and sufficient condition for overshooting
is that (a2 +a3),
the elasticity of domestic and foreign demand with respect
to relative prices, be less than one. If, in addition, outputis always at
its full employment level, a2 =a3
=0,6 =0,and the Det =0schedule is
vertical. This is exactly Dornbusch's fixed output model; the exchange rate
always overshoots. The innovation in this model is that, evenwith fixed
output, the exchange rate can undershoot. All thatis necessary is that the
degree of monetary accommodation to prices be sufficiently large, i.e.,that
9a7 +a9> 1. Allowing output to respond to relative prices merelystrengthens
the case for undershooting.
The intuition behind these results is as follows. Because of thelong
run purchasing power parity assumption, the increase in the domestic steady
state money Supply ()increasesthe steady state exchange rate ()andprice
ratio (j). Assuming that both countries' monetary policies accommodateprice
movements, this causes the component of the domestic money supply that
responds to prices to decrease and the foreign money supply to increase.24
First, consider the case where output is fixed. Remembering that prices are
pre—determiried, if monetary policy is sufficiently accommodative so that
a7 +a9> 1, the increase in the domestic steady statemoney supply causes a
decrease in the money suply ratio (m —mr).Asset market equilibrium then
requires the domestic interest rate to exceed the foreIgn interest rate, which
in turn is only consistent with expected (and actual by perfect foresight)
exchange rate depreciation, Thus the exchange rate must jump (depreciate) to
a point where it will continue to depreciate; it must undershoot.
These results are not as restrictive when output is flexible. Since
output depends on relative prices, and the price ratio is pre—deteriuined, an
increase in ,bycausing an immediate depreciation of the exchange rate, will
increase the relative price of foreign goods. This increases the ratio of
domestic to foreign output (y —y).Output flexibility can substitute for
accommodative monetary policy to produce exchange rate undershooting. It is
no longer necessary that the increase in the steady state money supply produce
a decrease in the money supply ratio, only that the increase in the money
supply ratio be smaller than the increase in the output ratio. As above,
asset market equilibrium then requires the domestic interest rate to exceed
the foreign interest rate, which produces exchange rate undershooting.
10IV. Empirical Results: The Deutsch Mark/Dollar Rate
The theoretical model derived above relates exchange rate behavior to
activist monetary policy, in particular to the extent to which monetary policy
accommodates price movements. In this section, the model is estimated for
Germany and the United States, using quarterly data since theadvent of
generalized floating in 1973.
In order to estimate the model, it is necessary to derive the reduced
form. First, substituting equations as in the perfect foresIght solution, and





















where the u's are combinations of the L's.
Before proceeding further, we need to make some assumption about the
structure of the error terms. We assume that they are generated bysecond
order autoregressive processes, i.e., uj =1uj_1
÷ + = 1,
••, 6,where the n's are serially uncorrelated. Since, in order to derive
the reduced form, the error terms must be finite moving average processes, we
take the infinite moving average processes implicit in the above
autoregressive processes and truncate themappropriately.25
11To derive the reduced form for equation (9), assume that expectations are







where A and B are 2 x 2 matrices.
The derivation of (14) is straightforward but tedious.26 The elements of
A and B are non—linear combinations of the 5's and the ct's.The V's are
combinations of the n's, written so as to make the zero lag coefficient matrix
the identity matrix. The constraints on the parameters are caused by the form
of the structural equations, the assumption of rational expectations, and the
stability condition necessary to achieve a unique solution.27
The model to be estimated consists of equations (1O)—(14). By truncating
the implicit moving average representation of the disturbances at third order
for u1 and fourth order for the others, a first order autoregressive fourth
order moving average model is derived. Maximum likelihood estimates
(conditional on the initial disturbances being set equal to zero) are obtained
under the assumption that (v1
V2 u3 u4 u5 u6)' is multivariate
normal.28 The policy(a6 —a9)and structural (a1 —a5)parameters are
jointly estimated. This, combined with the imposition of rational
expectations, satisfies several aspects of Lucas' (1976) critique of
econometric policy evaluation.29
As described above, the model is estimated for the United States and
Germany, using quarterly data for 1973(II)—1981(iv).30 Real GNP is used to
measure output, and Ml for the money supply. It is not clear what is the
appropriate measure for the price level. While the GNP deflator is the best
aggregate for the money demand equation, the wholesale price index (WPI) is a
12better proxy for traded goods prices, and thus a better measure for relative
prices. Since, in addition, there did not seem to be any reason why monetary
policy should respond identically to the two measures, we performed the
estimation with both.31
The maximum likelihood estimates of the structural (a1 —a5),policy
(a6 —a9),
and serial correlation (cL1.) parameters are given in Table 1 along
with their asymptotic "t—ratios," the ratio of the coefficients to their
standard errors computed from the inverse of the second derivative matrix of
the likelihood function. Germany is taken as the domestic country, so that a6
is the response of the German money supply to the exchange rate, a7 the
response of the German money supply to the price ratio, —a8the response of
the American money supply to the exchange rate, and —a9 the response of the
American money supply to the price ratio.
The most noteworthy aspect of the estimates is that both and are
positive for the two measures of the price level, implying exchange rate
overshooting.32 The policy parameters that produce this result are quite
different, however, for the twopricelevel measures. For the wholesale price
index, the money supply is not responsive to either the exchange rate orthe
price ratio. All four coefficients (— ) aresmall, and only one, the
response of the American money supply to the exchange rate,is significant.
For the GNP deflator, while American monetary policy is very accommodativeof
prices, German policy is sufficiently offsetting so that thecombined policies
are not accommodative enough to produce undershooting. German monetary policy
also offsets exchange rate movements. American monetary policy is
unresponsive to the exchange rate. Variable output is insufficientto produce
undershooting. The sum of the coefficients of relative prices inthe output
13equations (a2 +a3)is very small for the GNP deflator and not large enough to
matter for the WPI.33
Neither Dornbusch's nor Mussa's price equation receives much support from
the estimates, since a4 is negative in both cases. (a4 equals zero in
Dornbusch's and one in Musa's specifications.) Althougha4 is quite small,
especially for the CNP deflator, the values for 63 and 64 are very different
from those that could have been generated from Dornbusch's formulation (where
63 =—64). The coefficient of relative prices in the price adjustment
equation (a5) and the interest rate semi—elasticity of the demand formoney
(a1) are of the expected sign. For the WPI, while these structural parameters
are almost all of the expected sign and magnitude, they are at best borderline
significant. For the GNP deflator, while they are all, significant,ai is
implausibly small. We investigate this further below.
The estimates are generally more successful for the GNP deflator than for
the WPI. For the GNP deflator, all of the structural, and all but one of the
policy, coefficients are significant. Activist monetary policy, while not
producing undershooting, is clearly important in the determination of the
Deutsche Mark/Dollar rate. For the WPI, several of the structural
coefficients are of questionable significance, and the policy coefficients are
generally insignificant. Activist monetary policy does not seem to matter
very much.
A number of the other features of the estimates are worth mentioning.
The correlations between the estimated arid actual values of the variables are
fairly high. There is one stable root and one unstable root in each case,
indicating that the stability condition is sufficient to provide a unique
solution. A formal test of the modelisprovided by estimating an
"unconstrained" version. This imposes the same policy equations and serial
14correlation structure as the constrained version, but does not impose the
forms of the structural equations or the rational expectations restrictions.
By comparing the log—likelihoods of the constrained and theunconstrained
models, we construct a likelihood ratio test. While the likelihoodratio test
rejects the constrained model in comparison with theunconstrained for both
cases, the estimates involving the GNP deflator comemuch closer to not being
rejected. The rejection of the constrained model for the WPIaccords with
Driskill and Scheffrin's (1981) findings for Frankel'smodel.35
It is illustrative to compare these results with those obtained from
estimating a somewhat less constrained model. In this"semi—constrained"
version, the 5's are left unrestricted, but all of the otherconstraints of
the model are imposed. This breaks the previously imposed linkage betweenthe
magnitude of the policy parameters (a6 —a9),
the magnitude of tF
elasticities of demand with respect to relative prices (a2 and a3), and the
question of overshooting. While all of the equations arestill jointly
estimated, the policy parameters (as well as a2 and a3) now only enterinto
equations (1O)—(13). They do not affect the reduced formof equation (14).
Since these parameters do not affect the estimates of e and q, they are
irrelevant for considering overshooting.
The maximum likelihood estimates of the semi—constrained model are
presented in Table 2. They provide strong support for theovershooting
results implied by the constrained estimates. The values of and are
positive in both cases, and the significance levels arehigh.36 The signs and
magnitudes of the structural and policy parameters are quitesimilar between
the constrained and semi—constrained models in both cases. Theseresults
indicate that the finding of overshooting for the constrained modelis not
simply a construct imposed by the restrictions on cSi and and the magnitudes
15of the policy parameters. Another way of considering the results is that,
given the finding of overshooting from the semi—constrained model, the
estimates of the constrained model are consistent with the theoretical
hypotheses on the affects of activist monetary policy. This perspective can
be evaluated more formally by considering likelihood ratio tests. Comparing
the log—likelihoods of the constrained and semi—constrained models, we cannot
reject the constrained model at standard significance levels.37 This
indicates that the rejection of the constrained when compared with the
unconstrained model is caused by the assumption of rational expectations and
imposition of the stability condition necessary to guarantee a unique
solution, not by the form of the structural equations.
One of the characteristics of the estimates for the GNP deflator is that,
since a2 is approximately equal to—as, variable output is virtually
irrelevant. With this in mind, we estimated a variant of the model where
output, assumed to be constant, does not appear once deviations are taken from
the steady state. This can be thought of as taking the model described by
equations (1O)—(14) and setting a2, a3, and their associated 5's equal to
zero. The estimates of this are presented in Table 3. The values and
significance levels of the parameters are quite similar to those in Table 1,
and the exchange rate again overshoots. One advantage of this variant is
that, with six fewer parameters to estimate, the power of the likelihood ratio
test is increased. While the constrained model can still be rejected when
compared with the unconstrained model at standard significance levels, it
comes much closer to not being rejected than the model which includes
output ,38
The final aspect of the estimates for the GNP deflator that we
investigate is the role played by the implausibly small estimate of the
16interest rate semi—elasticity of the demand for money (a1). To accomplish
this, we first estimate (1) using a single equation method.39 This allows us
to utilize interest rate data (we use three—month money market rates for
Germany and the United States)4° and provides an estimate for a1. The
estimate (.54) is much more in accord with work on the demand for money than
the estimates of a1 in Tables 1 and 3. We then estimate the full model
(including output) as above, with•the additional constraint that a1 =•54.
The estimates of this model are presented in Table 4. The only coefficients
that change very much are those in the price adjustment equation (a4 and a5),
and they change so as to keep the values of (53 and (54 exactly equal to their
magnitudes in Table 1. This again highlights the desirability of further
investigation of the price adjustment process. The overshooting results are
unaffected. and are both positive, although much smaller than in
Table
V. Conclusions
This paper shows that, in the context of a model with perfect capital
mobility and slow price adjustment, monetary policy that accommodates price
movements has the potential to cause exchange rate undershooting. It extends
earlier work, which focused on imperfect capital mobility and variable output,
to provide another reason why overshooting is not an intrinsic characteristic
of the foreign exchange market. It also provides strong econometric evidence
that, for the current flexible rate period, the Deutsche Mark/Dollar exchange
rate does exhibit overshooting. This occurs both with the Wholesale Price
Index, where there is little price responsiveness to either country's monetary
policy, and with the GNP deflator, where, while American monetary policy is
highly accommodative to prices, German monetary policy is sufficiently
offsetting to cause overshooting.
17FOOTNOTES
'flood (1981) and Leidermarz (1982) providerecent evidence of this.
2Dornbusch also showed how variableoutput would eliminate the necessity
of overshooting. We will consider variable output in Section [II. Calvo and
Rodriguez (1977) showed how overshooting could occur with perfectly flexible
prices and imperfect capital mobility. Levich (1981) surveys and analyzes
several types of overshooting models. We will not consider overshooting
models of other than the Dornbusch type in thispaper.
31f disturbancesare anticipated in Dornbusch's model, as in Wilson
(1979) or Gray and Turnovsky (1979), the initial depreciationcan be below the
steady state, followed by further depreciation above the long run equilibrium,
and finally by appreciation back to the steady state. Since theexchange
rate, at some point, depreciates by more than its long run equilibrium
depreciation, this is an example of overshooting.
4Activistmonetary policy has been studied for its effect on output and
price variability in a closed economy context by Taylor (1980) and in anopen
economy context by Leiderman (1981), Rehm (1982), and Taylor (1982). Flood
(1981) considers activist monetary policy (in the sense of interest rate
stabilization) and exchange rate volatility, but in a context where observers
do not correctly perceive the money supply rule.
5rhe stochastic version of this modelcontains a number of implications
regarding the effect of activist monetary policy on exchange rate
variability. These will be tested, in the context of that model, in a
subsequent paper.
6By assuming perfect capital mobility andby not incorporating lags in
the output and/or the money supply equations, we restrict the model toa
system of two first—order difference equations. This simplification allows us
to derive straightforward theoretical results using graphical solution
techniques. A complementary modeling strategy is to first specify a model
that is too complicated to be solved analytically, gain Insight into the
workings of the model through simulation, and then estimate it. While this
would be superior econometrically, the method used in thepaper results in
clearer theoretical propositions.
7The theoretical results would not have beenaffected if they were
presented in a single, small country model. The two—country framework was
chosen to econometrically incorporate both countries'money supply rules and
to avoid making exogeneity assumptions regarding "foreign" interest rates,
output, and prices.
8The assumption that the interest ratesemi—elasticities of the demand
for money are identical in the two countries, while notvery satisfactory,
seems to be unavoidable without greatly complicating the model. Frankel
(1979) and Driskill and Sheffrin (1981) make the same assumption.
9Mussa (1982)argues that the appropriate deflator for nominal balances
is a weighted average of domestic and foreign goods price levels (denominated
18in domestic currency). With the income elasticities of the demand for money
equal to unity, this, as shownbyFlood (1981), does not affect Equation
(1). We do not incorporate the effect of the exchange rate on the domestic
goods price level through imports of intermediate goods.
1O would be preferable to allow lags in the output equation, but this
greatly complicates the model. Allowing each country's output to depend on
the real interest rate and/or the other country's output does not
substantially affect the results. While the exact conditions for over and
undershooting are not identical, they do not change enough to make much
difference.
11The assumption that output is demand determined is made for comparison
with Dornbusch's work. A model with a Lucas type aggregate supply function
could yield an identical reduced form.
'2Mussa's argument is that his formulation has both a better
inicroeconomic rationale and more sensible steady state properties than
Dornbusch' s formulation.
'3The assumption of pre—determined prices allows us to put actual (p1)
instead of expected foreign prices in equation (4c). The equilibrium
price level (e +p)clears the goods market in the short run and is
consistent with long run purchasing power parity. Engle and Frankel (1982)
and Glaessner (1982) have used similar specifications of Mussa's formulation.
'41n addition, the money supply could have been postulated to depend on
the interest rate differential which, in this model, is equivalent to the
expected rate of depreciation. The issues raised in that formulation are
discussed in Papell (1983). Allowing lags in the money supply equations
greatly complicates the analysis.
'5Sources of error in the money supply processes from having prices not
pre—determined, as in Flood and Hodrick (1982), or the monetary authorities
not being able to use all of the information contained in the contemporaneous
exchange rate can be subsumed in c1 and C5.
16Themoney supply could be allowed to respond separately to domesticand
foreign price levels if we were willing to assume that the policy coefficients
were identical across the two countries. This assumption seems less tenable
than the one made in the paper, and is not supported by the empirical results.
17Cumby and Obstfeld (1982) find that Germany is the only country (out of
five tested) where uncovered interest rate parity cannot be rejected vis—a—vis
the United States. While Hansen and Hodrick (1982) find statistically
significant risk premia between the forward and the expected future spot rate,
their evidence indicates that these risk premia are small. In Papell (1983)
imperfect capital mobility is modeled as a flow adjustment process (as in
Frenkel and Rodriguez (1982)) to investigate overshooting of the effective
exchange rate for Germany and Japan. Modeling imperfect capital mobility as a
stock adjustment process greatly complicates the analysis.
1918By "the money supply," we mean thesum of the coefficients of the
domestic (a6) and foreign (a8) money supplies.
'9We do not consider thepossibility, studied by Calvo (1981), that a
devaluation would decrease domestic income, thus making ô < 0. Whilethis
"contraction—devaluation" case is more appropriate for hi focuson "southern
cone" countries operating managed exchange rates than forour focus on
flexible exchange rates, it is interesting to note that the "contraction-
devaluation" case could produce non—uniqueness in our modelas well as in
his. We will explore these issues in a subsequentpaper.
20While these diagramsare more common in continuous time, Mussa uses
them in a discrete time model. The theoretical results hereare presented in
discrete time for comparison with the empirical work in Section IV.
21lricorporating anticipated disturbances does notchange the results as
long as overshooting is interpreted as occurring at some point in time,as in
footnote 3, rather than necessarily on impact.
221n general, an increase in thedomestic money supply will also shift the Dq =0schedule to maintain long run purchasing power parity. For the
particular case illustrated (a =0),the movement along the Dq 0 schedule
restores the steady state equilibrium.
23The diagram illustrates thecase where I2I < If monetary policy
was even more accommodative, so that I2l > tS, exchange rate undershooting
would still occur.
241n order to seethis, note that equations (5) and (6) can be written
(with perfect foresight) as:
(5)
(6)
Since q is pre—determined, the increase inproduces an immediate
decrease in the component ofnit that depends on (c1 —) andan increase in
m.
25The advantage to using thisprocedure rather than starting directly
with the finite order moving average representation is that it reduces the
number of parameters to be estimated without particularlyconstraining the
system.
26The derivation is available from theauthor upon request. The model
can, of course, be solved by other methods, such as in Blanchard and Kahn
(1980).
27The system has tworoots, A1 and A2. In order for there to be a unique
solution, one of the roots must be stable (<1)and one unstable (>1).The
stability condition consists of setting the coefficient of the unstable root
equal to zero. This is equivalent to restricting the economy to be on the
saddle path after a disturbance.
2028More detail on the econometric method can be found in Taylor (1980).
29The model clearly does not satisfy other aspects of the Lucas critique,
such as concern that macroeconomic models be derived from utility maximization
of individual agents.
30To be exact, we started with data from 1973(I)—1981(IV) and, since one
observation is "lost" in estimating an ARMA(1, 4) model, performed the
estimation over the described period.
31me exchange rate used was the quarterly, period average rate, taken
from International Financial Statistics. End—of—period rates were also tried;
they made little difference. The money supply was end—of—period, also taken
from IFS. It was felt that end—of—period money supply data would be a better
measure of within period responsiveness to exchange rates and prices than
period averages. The other data were taken from Survey of Current Business
(United States) and Deutsche Bundesbank (Germany). All data, except for the
exchange rate and the WPI, was seasonally adjusted. In order to achieve
stationarity, all variables, after taking logarithms, were detrended by
regression on a constant and linear time trend.
32The concept of overshooting, as defined by Dornbusch, describes the
behavior of the exchange rate after a permanent increase in the money supply,
whileforthe empirical work, all disturbances are temporary. In this
context, overshooting should be interpreted as the existence ofestimated
parameter values such that, in the deterministic model, a permanentincrease
in the money supply would cause exchange rate overshooting. Flood (1981) and
Levich (1981) discuss other definitions of overshooting in a stochastic
context. These are related to concepts of exchange rate volatility, and do
not necessarily correspond to Dornbusch's concept of overshooting.
33The signs of the coefficients (a2 and a3) in the output equations are
puzzling. Both German and American output declined (relative to trend) in
1974—75 and 1980—81, following the two major oil price increases, and
increased in 1976—79. Assuming that the oil shocks dominated relative price
effects, this can account for a2 and a3 being of opposite sign, but notfor
the sign reversal between the estimates for the GNP deflator and the WPI. We
experimented with including the other country's output in each country's
output equation, but this neither changed the sign pattern for a2 and a3 nor
improved the estimates.
341ri an earlier version of the paper, we estimated the model with
Dornbusch's price equation. The current formulation provides clearly superior
econometric results. We also attempted to estimate the model with Mussa's
equation,but could not get the estimates to converge at an optimum.
Comparison of the constraints (6 and 64)impliedby either Dornbusch's or
Mussa's formulations with those implied by the estimated values reveals large
discrepancies,indicatingtheprobable reason why these estimates were not
successful.
35LetL(u) be the log of the likelihood function for the unconstrained
model, L(c) the log of the likelihood function of the constrained model, uthe
number of parameters estimated for the unconstrained model and c the number
of parameters estimated for the constrained model. Then2(L(u) —L(c))is
21distributed chi—squared (u —c).The log of the likelihood function of the
unconstrained model for the GNPdeflatoris 657.880, and for the WPI is
628.369. The unconstrained model contains 28 estimated parameters, indicating
rejection of the constrained model at standard significance levels. These
results should be interpreted with caution, however, since we have relatively
few observations and the small sample properties of the likelihood ratio test
are not well known. Driskill and Scheffrin (1981) hypothesize that one of the
reasons their estimates fail the likelihood ratio test is the endogeneity of
the German money supply. While our data and estimation techniques are not
identical to theirs, our results clearly fail to support that conjecture.
Another possibility is that the assumption of pre—determined prices is
unwarranted. Glaessner (1982) estimates a similar modelwithan exogenous
money supply and flexible prices for Canada which is also rejected by the
likelihood ratio test. Models in which prices are neither flexible nor pre-
determined, such as in the recent theoretical work of Flood and Hodrick
(1982), provide another alternative for future empirical research.
36Both parameters aresignificantly different from zero for the GNP
Deflator, and of borderline significance for the WPI.
37me semi—constrained model contains 22parameters. With s —c=1,
2[L(s) —L(c)]equals .42 for the GNPdeflator,significant at the 50% level,
and equals .71 for the WPI,significantat the 25% level.
38The log of the likelihood function for the unconstrainedmodel,
containing 20 parameters, is 413.180. With u —c=5,2[L(u) —L(c)]equals
12.11, significant at the 2.5% level.
39We use the ARt procedure ofTSP, which provides efficient estimates of
an equation whose disturbances display first order serial correlation.
40The interest rates were taken from World Financial Markets.They were
detrerided by regression on a constant and linear time trend.
41me constrained model is again rejected incomparison to the
unconstrained by the likelihood ratio test.
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24Table I
GNPDeflator Wholesale Price Index
Constrained Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Estimate Asymptotic Estimate Asymptotic
"tratio" tratio"
a1 .004 3.85 .22 1.55
a2 .19 3.73 —.30 —2.25
a3 —.22 —3.65 .48 3.22
a4 —.007 —3.99 —.09 —1.56
a5 .40 2.51 .03 1.39
a6 —d24 —5.05 —.03 —.53
a7 —2.71 —8.42 .14 1.00
a8 —.01 —.25 .08 2.24
a9 3.49 10.73 .11 .90
.86 7.71 1.82 6.67
a12 —.11 —.81 —1.58 —3.22
a21 .35 3.98 .60 4.66
"22 .36 4.29 —.29 —2.83
a31 .92 14.15 .75 6.96
"32 —.03 —.33 .19 1.49
"41 .28 3.29 .27 2.36
"42 .39 4.51 .16 1.67
"51 1.05 7.23 1.06 9.08
"52 —.29 —1.79 —.41 —4.32
"61 1.12 10.31 1.11 10.72
"62 —.42 —3.91 —.42 —5.02














GM? Deflator Wholesale Price Index
Semi—Constrained Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Estimate Asymptotic Estimate Asymptotic
"t ratio" "t ratio'
477.20 17.02 .63 1.93
62 477.64 15.40 2.72 1.73
63 .03 15.68 —.02 —1.03
64 —.85 —18.96 —.29 —2.09
a2 .20 3.34 —.29 —2.03
a3 —.23 —2.95 .54 2.90
a6 —.22 —3.15 —.10 —1.00
a7 —2.64 —3.98 .18 .99
a8 —.oi —.22 .07 1.80
a9 4.15 4.47 .13 1.01
ii .88 24.57 1.79 7.01
a12 —.13 —13.55 —1.53 3.34
a21 .35 4.04 .63 4.37
a22 .37 4.12 —.28 —2.87
a31 .91 13.70 .81 6.84
a32 —.01 —.13 .11 .80
a41 .29 3.30 .27 2.39
U42 .39 4.26 .18 1.75
U51 1.07 24.57 1.06 9.09
a52 —.31 —13.55 —.41 —4.31
a61 1.13 10.88 1.12 11.20
a62 —.43 —4.39 —.42 —5.25
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Correlation Between Actual and Estimated Values
e .83
q .87
a .95
.83
y .89
.88
LogLikelihood
643. 271Figure 2
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